Legacy of secrecy
Keith Jeffery’s new book is full of hidden policies and intrigue
By Aamir Riaz
MI6: The History of the Secret
Intelligence Service 1909-49
By Keith Jeffery
Publisher: Bloomsbury, 2011
Pages: 840
Price: Rs 1195
“By the beginning of 1947 it was clear that the territory (British India) would become independent (as it did when it was partitioned into India & Pakistan) and SIS (Secret Intelligence Service, MI6) begun to consider what intelligence arrangements would be necessary in the future. On New Year’s Day 1947 a meeting of representatives of MI5, SIS, and the India Office’s intelligence organization, Indian Political Intelligence (IPI), met to consider the issue….As for SIS, it was recognized that even if the independent government of India was ‘willing to liaise in a friendly manner, it was improbable that they would, either on account of inefficiency or lack of interest, be able to furnish all the information required by HMG’. Thus it was proposed that SIS should set up a covert organization in post-independence India.” Keith Jeffry gleamed this from the record of 40 years archive of SIS, pinpointing a conversation between Menzies and Hayter dated 17 January 1947. Sir Stewart Menzies was chief of SIS from 1939-52 while Sir William Hayter was head of Foreign Office Services, Liaison Department. In the conversation, Menzies told Hayter that he would take over some of the work currently done by IPI, including intelligence about British India itself and also about its neighbouring countries especially USSR.
If we read Jeffery’s book along with Patrick French’s famous book Partition of India: Liberty or Death based on the British intelligence reports declassified in the mid 1990s, it will help readers to understand hidden policies and intrigues in that era.
MI6: The history of the SIS 1909-49 is full of such records which include the British spying on Germans, Ottomans, Japanese, Chinese, Russians, Americans, Indians, and Pakistanis etc. No historian can really understand the politics of 20th century without having spent time with intelligence records. In his preface, Jeffery writes “reviewing the work of SIS in the early 1920s, one officer observed that the SIS headquarters receives from its overseas branches over 13000 reports per annum.” If one multiply this number with 40, than you can well imagine the magnitude of tedious work Jeffery had to go through.
Intelligence work always needs an enemy. Enemy construction is always subservient to trade interests. For centuries, empires and modern nation states are following this Machiavellian theory.
In the good old days, Land Trade Routes (LTRs) had a unique importance. One can gauge its importance by the example of Silk Trade Route. Yet after the 12th century, pirates not only discovered sea routes but also developed heavy ships. Gradually naval powers started capturing sea routes which ultimately diverted world politics towards new trade horizons which gave birth to more innovative enemy constructions. The whole issue of regional security was a product of capturing Sea Trade Routes (STRs). Britain developed fortress colonies such as Gibraltar, Malta and Aden to secure its STRs. From mid 19th century till the Second World War, British diplomacy worked to protect its STRs along with a Forward Policy towards joining corners of LTRs. SIS’s 40 year record supports the British administration interest in STRs.
The 1893 Durand Line agreement and the 1914 McMahon Line agreement decided the fate of LTR in favour of STRs. After those agreements smugglers, revolutionaries and spies had liberty to use LTRs, yet formal trade was abandoned. This status still prevails for the last 100 years. Keeping in view that background, one can enjoy Jeffery’s book along with the politics behind security regimes. In his more than 800 page book Jeffery tries his best to advocate British interests. “The corollary to understand access to the archives has been an extremely painstaking and fastidious disclosure process. From the start it was laid down that the identity of any agent could not be revealed for the first time in this book. One result of this stipulation is the regrettable need (from the historian’s point of view) to omit some significant and important SIS stories.”
Jeffery details all three SIS chiefs’ tenures till 1949, Mansfield Cumming (1909-23), Hugh Sinclair (1923-39) and Stewart Menzies (1939-52) yet he admitted that without pivotal role of Government Code (GC) and Cypher School (CS), SIS could not get success in protecting Britain’s interests. “This branch of British intelligence community was notably successful. John Ferris has estimated that the GC&CS was one of the world’s largest code-breaking agencies, perhaps the biggest; as effective as any other, better than most, possibly the best on earth between 1919 and 1935.”
While the book has much information, covert as well as overt stories, yet it fails to record reactions of the British intelligence agencies at the demise of the Empire. Neither has Jeffery written anything about the 1941 Atlantic Charter which pressurised Britain to start a process of decolonisation process under US pressure.
The relationship between intelligence agencies and parliaments is the most debatable issue especially in developing democracies. Jeffery admitted the fact that Britain’s overseas intelligence networks have been working under its foreign office rather than the interior ministry while the foreign office is always answerable to the parliament. One wonders why developing democracies like India and Pakistan are still reluctant to follow it.
The manifesto of the SIS (which can be read on the SIS website) might give some answers. “SIS is part of our democratic society. The parliament and citizens need to be confident that our activities are within UK law, ethical, and consistent with our national values. Like any other part of the government, SIS is subject to UK law, as are SIS members of staff. The following sets out how SIS is accountable to Parliament. Oversight of SIS and its operations is exercised through Ministers (primarily the Foreign Secretary), Parliament (The Intelligence and Security Committee) and two independent Commissioners who provide judicial expertise. These arrangements are set out in two key pieces of UK legislation, the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (ISA) and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.”
MI6: The History of The Secret Intelligence Service 1909-49 is available at Readings
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