EU Final Report on the 25 July general elections in Pakistan

Exposed rigging & interference

Generally media and civil society as well as previous parliament is praised who did their jobs in such odd circumstances yet this report is an eye opener for those think we are very smart. The report with 30 valuable recommendations supported transition to democracy but pinpointed interference in election extensively. As signatory of numerous (particularly six as mentioned in the report) international agreements, treaties etc Pakistan should fulfill its commitments but before and after 25th July elections it earned a bad name. The final report (Published at 26th October 2018) needs special attention of Parliamentary Committee & struggling media & Civil Society so that Pakistan can revive its pride as sovereign, independent and forward looking country.

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Extracts are here and link of complete 91 pages report is at the end.

Unlike in previous elections, it faced unprecedented delay in the deployment of the whole mission. Due to a series of bureaucratic delays, including with issuing visas and accreditations, EU long-term observers arrived in Pakistan later than planned and were deployed to districts only one week, sometimes less, before election day.
The 25 July 2018 general elections followed, for the first time in Pakistan’s history, two terms of continuous civilian rule with two elected legislatures completing their terms. The elections took place against a background of allegations of interference in the electoral process by the military-led establishment and the role of the judiciary as a political actor.
An increase in violent attacks and threats targeting political parties, party leaders, candidates and election officials severely affected the campaign environment in the two weeks before election day.
The ECP made limited efforts to improve its transparency and accountability during the electoral period. The lack of regular communication with civil society and political parties, as well as timely information to voters on key stages of the electoral process, such as the failure to announce provisional results on time, increased the level of distrust between stakeholders and the ECP, and damaged the institution’s reputation.
Notwithstanding several legal provisions aiming to ensure a level playing field, there was a notable lack in equality of opportunity.
At first glance, Pakistan’s media appears vibrant, seemingly offering a platform for a free and pluralistic exchange of ideas. Comprehensive analysis of the media’s output, however, reveals that editorial policies were carefully calibrated to downplay issues relating to the army, state security structures and the judiciary. Concerted efforts to stifle the reporting environment were observed, and included intimidating phone calls to

senior editors, the disruption and hindrance of the distribution of broadcast and print outlets, and harassment of individual journalists. Most of the content restrictions that affected election coverage stem from the Constitution. Article 19 subjects freedom of expression to “any reasonable restrictions imposed by law”, which diverges from international standards. Excessive content limitations, citing security, religious and

moral concerns, are scattered throughout the legal framework for media, resulting in a catalogue of issues on which media cannot report
Overall the PML-N was the most featured party. However, up to two-thirds of its coverage was negative in tone, including on court cases against the party leadership and on prominent defectors.
The system for resolving electoral disputes is largely a judicial model, with judges of various courts involved at different stages. ECP orders also have the same weight as High Court rulings. There was considerable uncertainty over the resolution of electoral disputes, with a high number of petitions to the Supreme and High Courts. There was a lack of transparency regarding ECP decisions on electoral disputes, as well as late changes in the make-up of panels for ECP dispute hearings.
The Constitution guarantees the equality of all citizens and provides for the full participation of women in national life. The Elections Act foresees the cancellation of elections in constituencies where female turnout is less than ten per cent. However, the ECP annulled elections only in one provincial assembly constituency, but not in other constituencies where female turnout was just under 10 per cent. Each political party had to nominate at least five per cent of women candidates for general seats. Seven of 95 political parties failed tofulfil this requirement. Only eight of 172 women candidates were elected to general seats in the National Assembly compared to nine in 2013 and 16 in 2008.
The Elections Act 2017 gives the ECP powers to allow citizen observers and international observers to observe the electoral process. However, it is at the discretion of the ECP as to whether it actually allows groups to observe, as well as the extent of access it provides. Due to a lack of clear instructions on accreditation procedures, national and international observers faced difficulties with accreditation. Observers

were also hindered by the Code of Conduct for Security Officials which empowered security personnel to allow accredited observers and media stay at a polling station only for a brief period of time.
Overall, TDEA/FAFEN observation in 2018 was less visible in the field than in 2013.
ECP allowed the deployment of 370,000 army personnel inside as well as outside polling stations and increased their powers, including the provision of a parallel structure to report irregularities if the presiding officer did not take action.
However, the count, transmission and tabulation of results lacked transparency, leaving room for allegations of electoral malpractices.
The ECP did not meet the legal deadline for announcing provisional results by 02:00 on 26 July. On election night, the Results Transmission System (RTS) failed during the submission of results from polling stations and the ECP had to stop using it. Following widespread criticism, the ECP called for an enquiry commissionto identify reasons for RTS failure.
The EU EOM 2013 offered 50 recommendations for improving the framework for elections. Ahead of the 2018 general elections, five of these recommendations had been completely implemented. A further 33 recommendations were also reflected, at least partially, in the Elections Act 2017.
The EU EOM 2018 offers 30 recommendations for future electoral reform based on observations, analysis and extensive discussion with a range of stakeholders. It has eight priority recommendations
The EU EOM was led by Chief Observer Michael Gahler, a Member of the European Parliament from Germany. The EU EOM comprised a core team of ten analysts based in Islamabad and 60 long-term observers deployed in districts across Pakistan. All 28 EU member states as well as Norway were represented in the mission. On election day, the mission was reinforced by 41 locally-recruited short-term observers from the diplomatic staff of EU member state embassies, Norway, Switzerland, Canada and the

EU Delegation in Pakistan. A delegation of seven Members of the European Parliament, led by Jean Lambert from the United Kingdom, also joined the mission. On election day, 122 EU observers followed election proceedings (opening, voting and counting) in 476 polling stations in 113 constituencies in Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Islamabad Capital Territory. The mission did not observe in Balochistan due to security reasons.
The EU EOM encountered significant challenges and difficulties before and during its deployment to Pakistan for the 25 July elections. The European Union had previously deployed election observation missions to Pakistan, in 1997, 2002, 2008 and 2013, but did not face the problems that in 2018 substantially affected EU EOM standard modus operandi. Unlike in previous missions, the EU EOM faced unprecedented delay in the deployment of its observers.
Additionally, despite constant efforts, meetings with two main interlocutors, the ECP and the judiciary and the various courts, were very limited or did not take place at all. During the deployment of the EU EOM,core team analysts met only five times with ECP officials despite numerous official requests for regular meetings. All requests for meetings with the judiciary and the High Courts in the provinces were either denied or not replied to, and no information regarding complaints and appeals was shared with the mission.
Allegations of influence on the electoral process by the military-led establishment, as well as restrictions on freedom of expression, affected the political environment.
An increase in threats and violent attacks targeting political parties, party leaders, candidates and election officials severely affected the campaign environment in the two weeks before election day.
The dismissal of former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, in July 2017; his disqualification for life from holding public office for financial malfeasance in April 2018; and his arrest after an eleven-year prison sentence after the verdict of the Accountability Court on 6 July 2018 reshaped the political environment ahead of the elections. Most interlocutors acknowledged a systematic effort to undermine the former ruling party through cases of corruption, contempt of court and terrorist charges against its leaders and candidates.
The pre-electoral environment was marred by allegations of influence on the electoral process by the military-led establishment and the active role of the judiciary in political affairs, including through its special suo moto jurisdiction.12 The apparent collusion of interests between the army and the judiciary was particularly instrumental in the dismissal of Nawaz Sharif, and his disqualification for life from holding public office. Numerous reports depicted the armed forces and security agencies pulling strings to persuade candidates of anti-establishment parties to switch allegiance or to run as independents, contributing to splitting the votes and influencing the results.13

Media outlets and journalists suffered from undue restrictions on freedom of expression which resulted in widespread self-censorship. Several events prior to and during the campaign pointed to the shrinking space for free speech and genuine pluralism. For example, the distribution of Dawn newspaper was disrupted in May 2018 following an interview with Nawaz Sharif. In March 2018, GEO TV was taken off air across

most of the country and was not available on cable networks in cantonment areas throughout the campaign period. Several key broadcast media editors received phone calls from state actors advising not to live broadcast the return of Nawaz Sharif on 13 July. Media were also asked to mute any statement that might contain “anti-judiciary” speech. In addition, media did not air interviews conducted with the Sharifs in

London prior to their return to Pakistan, or PML-N, PPP, ANP and MMA leaders’ accusations of the military engineering the elections. Media referred to the Lahore High Court ruling from 16 April 2018 that upheld the ban on “anti-judiciary speeches”, based on Articles 19 and 68 of the Constitution. Overall, a range of state actors took resolute measures well before the elections to control the public political narrative and to silence any debate that might challenge the role of the military or to promote the supremacy of a civilian-led government.
Pakistan has adopted six key international treaties applicable to elections.16 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) were adopted over the last decade. Pakistan is also party to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (CPRW).
Nonetheless, during the election period, the courts were petitioned on many occasions. They operated as a de facto parallel system of electoral justice to that of the ECP. Thus there was uncertainty about the exact extent and limit of the courts’ jurisdiction in electoral matters. This issue was recently flagged in a Supreme Court appeal case.42 Notwithstanding, courts did handle petitions relating to election

matters. The Constitution addresses the right to stand in considerable detail, but the prescribed qualifications are at times vague and subjective. For example, requirements include being of good character, righteous and sagacious, honest and truthful.43 These criteria are tested during candidate scrutiny and on appeal to Appellate Tribunals. The Supreme Court has interpreted these criteria in several cases.44 In some cases, it

refused to exclude candidates unless presented with proof of dishonesty in the form of a court order.45 In others, the Court appears to have disqualified candidates without such prior evidence.46 Failing to satisfy the current criteria can result in disqualification for life from becoming a member of parliament. Some candidates have been disqualified for not being “truthful and honest.”47 A consistent way of addressing these issues needs to be identified and implemented.48 A recent Supreme Court judgement cogently summarises, “[…] the vague, uncertain, obscure and conflicting terminology used in different provisions of Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution…is bound to confuse the electorate at large, hound the candidates and their voters, embarrass the Returning Officers at the time of scrutiny of nomination papers, confound the Election Tribunals and become a nightmare for the lawyers and Courts in the years to come.