The War that ruined the region: Prelude to Pak-India Cold War 1965 to 2015

The War that ruined the region 

Prelude to Pak-India Cold War 1965 to 2015

50 years are enough to understand the phenomenon. Defeat of India from China in 1962 was a big challenge yet the conflict proved beneficial for both US and China. In post 2^nd WW scenario it was US that used Cold War smartly and now both India and Pakistan were ready to follow it. But under a defeatist nationalism one cannot use Cold Wars smartly; it proved self-destructive. So in the final analysis both countries fell in the web of extremism via narrow nationalisms. Here are some extracts from Farooq Bajwa’s book From Kutch to Tashkand. (Available at www.readings.com.pk)

Note: Recently I checked a 1964 geography textbook of Pakistan in which i did not found even the name of China as neighbouring country. It was a colonial legacy yet after 1966 it was impossible to ignore China in our textbooks. 

The 1962 Sino-Indian war and its impact

On 20 October 1962, the Chinese launched a strong attack on the McMahon Line along the north-east India/China border. Within four days the Chinese army had achieved all its military objectives by pushing the Indians back and were then ordered by Beijing to stop their advance. There then followed a lull in the fighting with the Chinese situated well within territory claimed by India, but diplomatic attempts to resolve the issue proved fruitless. The fighting resumed with the Chinese Red Army advancing again on the north-eastern front, and reaching within 30 miles of Assam. By 19 November, China had advanced as far as it wished and declared a unilateral ceasefire, and the Chinese army was ordered to withdraw a further 20 miles behind the border claimed by Beijing. The fighting was brief but the fallout was to be long-lasting. As the implications of a resurgent China, capable of easily defeating India, sent shockwaves throughout world capitals, the fallout for Pakistan was momentous. This was mainly because of Nehru’s increasingly volatile behaviour. As it became obvious that China was advancing with ease, Nehru appealed for immediate Western military support, abandoning the nonalignment which he had championed for over a decade with his official request for large amounts of US military aid. Nehru requested that the US send twelve squadrons of supersonic aircraft to be based in India in order to fight the Chinese on a long-term basis (Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1961–1963, Volume XIX: South Asia, 397). The US ambassador to India, John K. Galbraith, noted that this request meant ‘that the Indians are effectively pleading for military association’ (J. K. Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969, 486). Although in the event the US planes did not arrive in time, as China unilaterally called a halt to its advance, the speed and volume of US military aid sent to India during the conflict alarmed Pakistan. Even the previously staunchly pro-American Ayub was constrained to write a stiff letter to Kennedy on 17 December 1962 saying that such largescale arms transfers appeared to be unnecessary from a military point of view and India was merely using the Chinese threat as an opportunity to have the Americans fund their military expansion against Pakistan (FRUS, Document 228, 442). For the Americans, however, this was too good an opportunity to try and wean India away from the USSR and to bolster India in relation to China. In addition, Kennedy was in no mood to apply any pressure on India to relinquish Kashmir or even part of it merely to please Pakistan, and agreed with Galbraith that any attempt to do so would be seen by India as blackmail. The most that Kennedy requested was that India should agree to have talks with Pakistan on Kashmir once the war was over (Galbraith, 486, 501). Pakistan was now forced to confront the bitter reality that the Americans were prepared to arm India without any preconditions or any pressure on India to make concessions on Kashmir. It must have been a bitter moment for Ayub and the Pakistan establishment that a decade of pro-US alliance was being ignored by the US in favour of its most bitter enemy. However, the silver lining as far as Pakistan was concerned was that it now awoke to the reality that its northern neighbour, China, was more than capable of standing up to India and that there was a common enemy for both states. After tentative feelers were sent out by Pakistan in 1962, China indicated that it was willing to change its earlier attitude as far the Pakistan/China border was concerned. In October 1962 negotiations to demarcate their common border began between Chinese and Pakistani officials, and within a few months, on 2 March 1963, the border between the two states was agreed. Pakistan agreed to cede to China territory claimed by India north of Ladakh, while China agreed that around 750 square miles around Hunza was now within Pakistan. Although Pakistan achieved more from the territorial exchange itself, the real benefit was the realisation that China was very keen on improving relations with Pakistan. For China, it was an excellent chance to neutralise an Asian state which had been part of anti-communist blocs and US military pacts that for the last decade China had viewed as hostile. For China there was an added strategic benefit in having a friendly neighbour along one of its borders. For Pakistan, however, the potential benefits were even greater as China had proved itself militarily in Korea and now in a direct head-on clash with India, as a rising great power. It gave Pakistan the chance to widen its strategic options and lessen its dangerous over-dependence on the US for economic and military aid just as the US was now providing both to India. While China-Pakistan political relations prospered in the aftermath of the India-China conflict, so too did commercial relations, and agreements were signed in January and September 1963 which helped make China the biggest purchaser of Pakistani cotton in 1963. Of greater symbolic and political significance was an aviation agreement concluded in August 1963 which allowed Pakistan International Airlines to become the first non-communist airline to secure landing rights in China. In exchange the Chinese received landing rights in Karachi and Dhaka which enabled them, if they so wished, to fly to Europe and Africa without passing through Moscow. After the inaugural

 Pakistan International Airlines flight to Shanghai the Chinese Foreign Minister was able to say with satisfaction that those who tried to isolate China had failed. It was not until 1964, however, that China openly modified its position of neutrality on Kashmir in Pakistan’s favour. Then, on a visit to Pakistan, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai expressed the hope that the Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir. This was the exact position Pakistan had on Kashmir, and a veiled reference to the UN resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.

Kashmir

Realising the level of public discontent in ICK, the Indian government moved to lessen tension with restrictions on civil liberties loosened and permission granted to hold public meetings. On 8 April 1964, Sheikh Abdullah and his twenty-five co-defendants were released on the orders of Nehru and the state withdrew the charges against him in a trial which had lasted nearly six years and in which the prosecution had failed to secure a single conviction. After his release from jail and in a triumphant return to Srinagar, Sheikh Abdullah was warmly welcomed by large crowds and now began to openly challenge the official Indian claim that Kashmir’s accession to India was the final word on the subject. He insisted that the people of Kashmir were yet to exercise their right to self-determination as had been jointly agreed by India and Pakistan—statements which were highly unpopular in Delhi but received with pleasure in Rawalpindi.

 In 1964/65, the government of India initiated a series of legal and political measures designed to integrate ICK fully into the Indian Union politically and legally and to increase the powers of the Indian central government. On 4 December 1964 it was announced in the Indian Parliament that, with the ICK government’s ‘consent’, the Indian government intended to extend certain provisions of the Indian constitution to ICK. This was done while there was an ongoing debate inside the Lok Sabha (the Indian parliament), which sought to abrogate Article 370 in order to bring about Kashmir’s integration into India. Kashmir, which had been the only state within the Indian Union with its own constitution, was now pressured to change its constitution to allow for the designation of the head of state as governor and the prime minister as chief minister, to conform to the practice of other Indian states. The ICK Assembly passed this Bill unanimously on 30 March 1965, followed by the Legislative Council on 3 April. The diplomatic repercussions of the Indian unilateral changes were that Pakistan immediately objected in the UN and emphasised India’s repudiation of its obligations under the UN resolutions claiming this was further evidence of India’s intentions to solve the Kashmir dispute not through a plebiscite or negotiation but by unilateral decisions. If these moves went unchallenged, argued Pakistan, India would in the future claim that there was no longer a dispute and thereby hope to leave Pakistan with a fait accompli in accepting the CFL as the permanent border. In a letter to the UN Security Council, Pakistan argued these measures were ‘designed to tighten Indian stranglehold over Kashmir and to deny the right to the people to decide their own future’ (Letter from Pakistan Representative to Security Council, 20/4/64, quoted in Antony Wright, ‘The IndoPakistan War 1965’, unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1972, 51). Pakistan warned that the UN resolutions, the ceasefire order effective from 1 January 1949 and the Karachi Agreements establishing the ceasefire line constituted an interdependent system of actions and that it was therefore not open to either party to treat any single element as defunct without upsetting the whole framework. Fortunately for Pakistan, developments both within Kashmir and internationally meant that the issue was taken more seriously by the international community than it might otherwise have been, and not only the USA and Britain but also the USSR were all privately concerned by the Indian moves. The release of Sheikh Abdullah meant that in May 1964 he was able to visit Pakistan for the first time and meet Ayub— obviously with Nehru’s approval. There were meetings between Ayub and Sheikh Abdullah in Rawalpindi, and although full details of the talks are unavailable, it appears that towards the end of his life Nehru was rethinking his inflexible approach to Kashmir. To pretend that there was no dispute and the Kashmir issue was simply being kept alive by Pakistan was a fiction Nehru knew he could not maintain if he was to keep a credible foreign policy alive. In addition, Pakistan’s closer ties with China and already close ties with the US were factors that inevitably concerned the Indian prime minister. Finally, Nehru had always hoped to have India viewed as a beacon of morality and principle in world politics through the Non-Aligned Movement and the UN. The Kashmir issue was a blemish on India’s international image which, however hard he tried, would simply not go away. Nehru sent his daughter Indira Gandhi to Washington on 15 April to inform President Johnson that her father intended to hold a summit in Delhi with Ayub and Sheikh Abdullah to try and reach a permanent solution to Kashmir. Before any serious negotiations could begin, Nehru passed away on 27 May 1964 while Sheikh Abdullah was in Pakistan. This effectively put an end to what little hope there was for any swift negotiated solution in Kashmir. For an Indian politician to be able to surrender (from an Indian point of view) any part of the Valley was something only someone of Nehru’s stature could do and survive. It is of course ironic that no one had done more to ensure the Indian hold on ICK more than Nehru, and yet no one else was potentially capable of making any serious concessions to Pakistan over it. The new prime minister of India, Lal Bahadur Shastri, lacked the popularity and stature of Nehru, and Kashmir was a low priority for his new government as India had serious issues of food security to deal with. Sheikh Abdullah took advantage of his newfound freedom by embarking on a world tour in early 1965 following a visit to Mecca, and in Algiers he met the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and accepted in principle an invitation to visit Beijing. This invitation was not made public by the Chinese but by Bhutto, on 27 March in Karachi at a dinner with China’s Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister. The Indian government was already outraged by Abdullah’s overseas speeches and interviews and was further enraged by the Algiers meeting, even more so at the proposed visit being announced by Bhutto.

China, USSR, US and Pakistan

The fact that by the summer of 1965 all the signals coming from Washington regarding Pakistan’s ‘New Foreign Policy’ were negative, if not positively hostile, seemed to be either ignored or viewed as a temporary pressure tactic by Ayub and Bhutto. Although Pakistan had succeeded in improving relations with China and the USSR, the fact was that the Pakistan armed forces were equipped almost exclusively by US weaponry and US financial aid had been responsible in a large part for Pakistan’s last decade of economic growth; the Americans believed that Ayub was rational enough to realise that Pakistan had no alternative but to keep up excellent relations with them. Relations with the US by mid 1965 had now reached the point where on 30 July 1965 McConaughy was only able to meet Bhutto as Ayub refused to meet the US ambassador. Bhutto was described by McConaughy as being in a ‘personally cordial mood but substance remarks reflected hard GOP (Government of Pakistan) position encased in velvet glove’. Bhutto said that he regretted that Ayub had not been able to meet the ambassador despite repeated requests and gave a ‘new and candid reason’ for this. Ayub feared that ‘in his anger he would lose control of himself and make some undiplomatic statement to me’ and so was waiting until the situation had become clearer. McConaughy said that he was used to plain language and that Ayub could ‘speak to him as bluntly as he wished’; the more important thing, he said, was for a dialogue to be started, and ‘diplomatic niceties’ should not stand in the way. Bhutto said that he would pass on this message but in the meanwhile he had been authorised by Ayub to meet McConaughy and deal fully with him on Ayub’s behalf. McConaughy said that the US greatly regretted the Pakistan government’s decision to publicise the current problems and that he ‘specifically deplored’ Bhutto’s decision to stress in the National Assembly the existence of ‘certain other factors’ which had led to the aid consortium postponement. McConaughy said that this made a diplomatic resolution to this issue very hard. Bhutto claimed that the tradition of candour in the Assembly made it necessary for him to say that, and that news of the postponement needed to be broken by the Pakistan government to its parliament. Bhutto said the government was resolved to prevent antiAmerican violence and Ayub’s sense of grievance was aggravated by the fact that this was the second US snub, following on from the postponement of his trip to the US. Bhutto said that these two events had ‘convinced’ Ayub of an ‘unsympathetic and indifferent US attitude’ towards Pakistan.

British mediation

The hard slog of patient diplomacy now began, with James and Freeman tasked by Wilson with trying to find mutually acceptable proposals for both sides while trying to ensure that the uneasy peace was not disturbed. The negotiations were orchestrated by the Commonwealth Office in London and in Pakistan James dealt with Aziz Ahmed, the Foreign Secretary, while Freeman dealt with Jha. James said that he was forced at certain sticking points to appeal directly to Ayub when Aziz Ahmed was too inflexible, and at one point James was frustrated enough to suggest to Aziz Ahmed that he should communicate directly with his Indian counterpart: at which suggestion ‘Aziz reacted almost with horror’. Although the British took the lead in the negotiations, James confirms that the Americans were kept fully informed of the mediation efforts and gave the British initiative their full support and had stated their willingness to become involved if needed (James, 125–6). On 4 May the first draft of the British government proposal was put to both sides, but almost immediately rejected by Pakistan. On 5 May the Pakistan government said in response to the proposals that if the Indians were to keep a post in Chhad Bet, then the Pakistanis must also keep a post at Biar Bet. Despite this unpromising start, it was on 5 May that a public announcement was made in Pakistan of the de facto ceasefire. On 6 May McConaughy reviewed all the agreements between the US and Pakistan and India to see what assurances had been given by the US to both countries in case the Kutch talks were unsuccessful and both sides appealed to the US for help. The first agreement was the military aid treaty signed with Pakistan in 1954, which had stipulated that the military aid equipment provided by the USA was to be used for self-defence purposes by Pakistan, and there was an assurance in that treaty that Pakistan would not undertake an act of aggression against any other country. The issue of a US promise to Pakistan to protect it against Indian aggression was given in explicit assurances by following US aid to India, given in an aide-mémoire on 5 November 1962 stating that the ‘US will come to Pakistan’s assistance in the event of aggression from India against Pakistan’. On 17 November of the same year, the State Department had stated that if US aid to India was misused and directed at Pakistan, then the US ‘would undertake to thwart such aggression’. Similar assurances had been given to India in 1954 by President Eisenhower who stated that if Pakistan used its US weapons against India in an act of aggression, he would undertake to intervene (6/5/65 POL 32–1 India-Pak NA). It was these assurances that both India and Pakistan were now relying on to pressure the US to support its position, but so far, in Kutch, it was India alleging use by Pakistan of American weapons. The US response had been subdued thus far; it is interesting to speculate how a hard US line with Pakistan on the use of its equipment during the Kutch dispute might have discouraged Ayub from later action, but it appears that in April/ May 1965 the US was bogged down with Vietnam and other issues and did not want to provoke Pakistan further after an already bruising few months. India’s continued military build-up along the border with Pakistan was causing some concern to Ayub and his government, and on 7 May Pakistan complained to the UN Security Council that the bulk of the Indian armed forces had been moved to Pakistan’s Punjab border and were poised in offensive formations. India did not deny this allegation and Pakistan detailed the complaint by stating that four infantry divisions, one armoured division and an armoured brigade had been deployed within 25 miles of Indian Punjab and another Army unit had moved closer to the Kashmir ceasefire line. A British military review later stated that the Indian 1 Armoured Division was moved from Jhansi to east of Amritsar, 15 Infantry Division was moved from Dehra Dun to Amritsar, 4 Mountain Division from Ambala to Ferozepur, 6 Mountain Division from Bareilly to Jullundur, 2 Armoured Brigade from Patiala to south of Amritsar, 116 Mountain Brigade was moved from southern India and ordered to come under the control of 4 Mountain Division. 7 Infantry Division was normally stationed along the border and was now concentrated in Ferozepur. Therefore, by May 1965, India had moved one armoured division, one independent armoured brigade, and four infantry/mountain divisions under the operational control of 11 Corps at Jullundur. Along the Kashmir border, the Indian troops remained much as before, namely three infantry divisions (25, 26 and 19) and independent infantry brigades under 15 Corps at Udhampur (India-Pakistan War, May 1966 Ministry of Defence, PRO British military review, 4–5). The Pakistan Army had far smaller resources at its disposal and had traditionally stationed the bulk of its forces close to the Indian Punjab/Kashmir border. Along this border Pakistan had 1 Armoured Division stationed at Kharian, 15 Infantry at Sialkot, 10 Infantry at Lahore; the latter two divisions being of four brigade strength. Along the Kashmir border, the 12 Infantry Division comprised one regular brigade and around 18 Azad Kashmir infantry battalions. Apart from 6 Armoured Division and some elements of 8 Infantry Division, Pakistan had no real reserves.

De-freezing the Kashmir issue

Having viewed with satisfaction the Pakistan Army outgunning India, especially in the use of armour and artillery in the sand dunes of Kutch, Ayub was now a receptive listener to those who had been urging for some time that 1965 was an ideal time for a military solution to Kashmir. Ayub was by nature a cautious man who liked to weigh up and consider options presented by close advisers before making a decision. One of Ayub’s cabinet ministers of the time, G. W. Choudhury, describes how the critical decisions were made by Ayub. A few cabinet ministers such as Bhutto were described as having some influence, ‘but usually the cabinet would discuss peripheral issues such as a civil aviation pact…But the vital decisions—whether related to defence, foreign affairs or economic policy—were decided in the Presidential House with the help of an inner cabinet’. Rather than having a genuine debate in parliament or cabinet, Ayub’s technique was to have senior military officers ‘make a careful analysis of the pros and cons of the proposed course of action, one group presenting the case, while the other group acted as opponents of the proposed action’. In the case of proposed military action against India, ‘this well-established practice was not allowed’ (G. W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, Oxford University Press, 1993, 17–20). The arguments and voices of those in favour of the use of force in Kashmir, led by the Pakistan Foreign Ministry and a group of generals, became stronger and louder. The absence of genuine debate within the cabinet in Pakistan or even with all senior military officers led to obvious problems being overlooked or simply ignored. Planning ways to reactivate the Kashmir issue and to consider a military solution went back as far as 1964. Ayub asked the Intelligence Bureau to consider ways of keeping the Kashmir issue alive, and in early 1964 Aziz Ahmed was made Chairman of the newly formed ‘Kashmir Publicity Committee’ with the rather vague instruction of ‘keeping the Kashmir issue alive’ (G. Ahmed, 21). With its meetings held in the home of the Education Secretary to ensure secrecy, the deliberations were not recorded on paper; the Director of Military Intelligence would also attend the meetings as a member. The Foreign Ministry, led by Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed, was convinced that if given military and political direction, the population of ICK would rise up in popular revolt against India, and it appears that the group agreed with this conclusion. It was soon apparent, however, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Musa, was opposed to the idea as he felt that inadequate preparations were being made inside the Valley to organise armed resistance and that it would lead to a general war for which Pakistan was ill prepared and outnumbered. Musa also said that he wanted his opposition to the proposals noted for the record and for Ayub, and he claims that he ensured that he had a note sent to Ayub following one of the cell meetings in which he expressed his opposition to any premature military action. Ayub, Musa claimed, returned the note with the comment that ‘he [Ayub] agreed with GHQ’. Musa also wrote of Bhutto’s meeting with General Akhtar Malik, GOC 12 Division and other military officers, at the former’s house where Bhutto would try and urge the ‘indispensability of launching raids as soon as possible’. Musa says that he complained to Ayub about this ‘brainwashing’ by Bhutto and was assured by Ayub that he would put a stop to it (M. Musa, My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965, Lahore: Wajidalis, 1983,  5–10). The arguments used by the Foreign Ministry and Pakistan’s Military Intelligence, both of which were broadly in favour of military action, were: First, the recent military action in Kutch, which as discussed in the previous chapter had led Ayub to a number of military and diplomatic conclusions—all of which seemed to Ayub to point in favour of a successful limited military action by Pakistan. The feeling among some senior Pakistani generals was not only that the Indian Army was an ineffective fighting force in reality despite its large size, but also that the better quality US weapons gave Pakistan a military edge which could be exploited. Second, late 1964 had seen a surge of anti-Indian feeling in the Valley of Kashmir and there were reasons to think, after Sheikh Abdullah’s visit to Pakistan and the Hazrat Bal general strikes, that the political mood inside ICK was receptive to Pakistan’s move into the area. The hope was that if Pakistani trained and armed irregular and regular forces and made a decisive move into Kashmir, the population would rise up and place the Indian government in a difficult position of suppressing a popular revolt in Kashmir and simultaneously fighting a war with Pakistan. Even the fact that Sheikh Abdullah was in prison could be an advantage as he could serve as a reminder of Indian repression. Third, in the mid-1960s India was going through a difficult time politically and economically. A visit to South Asia by Talbot in 1964 reported that he had seen ‘the sharpest contrast in years’ between India and Pakistan, with Pakistan selfconfident and with a ‘new-found buoyancy’ that was in stark contrast with India which was facing serious economic problems. India in early 1965 was coming to terms with communal riots, food shortages and slow economic growth under an inexperienced and unknown prime minister (Cohen and Tucker (eds), 145). Fourth, India’s rearmament programme post-1962 meant that Pakistan was going to face a very different Indian Army in terms of both size and training in 1970 than it would in 1965. If Pakistan was ever going to mount a serious military challenge to India in Kashmir, according to the hawks in the Pakistan establishment, it could not be left later than 1965/66. In 1965 Pakistan was seen as having more modern weapons and superior armed forces morale, and time was seen as being on India’s side as its rearmament programme would mean that challenging it would be an almost impossible military proposition by 1970. Bhutto made no attempt to hide the fact that he urged Ayub to act quickly. He told his biographer that ‘I wrote to Ayub Khan saying that if we wanted to pursue a policy of confrontation with India, time was running out. We had to act now or it was too late’ (Salman Taseer, Bhutto, London: Ithaca Press, 1979, 60). Fifth, Pakistan’s ‘new’ foreign policy meant that of the major powers, Britain was on friendly terms with both India and Pakistan but unlikely to be much of a factor to consider in the event of a war. The three major powers that now counted in Asia were China, the USSR and the USA. China was now on extremely friendly terms with Pakistan as there was a common enemy in India and China was keen to make friends with a large Muslim state in Asia. In fact it is very likely that had the US not supplied weapons to Pakistan in the 1950s, Pakistan would have been requesting Chinese arms and equipment by 1965, but fear of the US reaction prevented such a request. The USSR was still far from being pro-Pakistan in 1965, but it is fair to say that it was also a far less hostile presence at the UN. The Soviet leadership seemed receptive to Ayub on his visit earlier in the year and was increasingly convinced that there was a growing rift between the US and Pakistan which it might be able to exploit at some time in the future. Relations with the US had rarely been cooler since 1954 when Pakistan joined the military aid pacts of the US, but Ayub was still sure that the US bases inside Pakistan gave Pakistan enough leverage with the US to be able to befriend China and also threaten India without too hostile a US reaction. On the issue of Kashmir, the US position had generally been sympathetic to Pakistan since 1948 and US diplomats had consistently expressed their private view that Pakistan held the moral high ground in Kashmir and some irritation that India’s refusal to make any concessions was threatening the stability of South Asia. Finally, Ayub had been badly shaken by the recent presidential election which he knew (and had ensured) had been rigged in his favour to ensure victory over Miss Jinnah. The result meant that he felt the need to regain popularity at home, and it is true to say then as now that nothing united West Pakistan like the issue of Kashmir. Success in Kashmir would have meant that the election and its dubious result would almost certainly be forgiven and forgotten if Ayub could somehow wrest Kashmir out of Indian control.

Comparison of forces’ strength

The Institute of Strategic Studies provides a neutral picture of the two armies’ strength on the eve of war. The ISS stated that the Indian Army had six infantry and nine mountain divisions at full strength, with a further four divisions under formation; one armoured division and armoured brigade armed with Centurion and Sherman tanks; and four light tank regiments. India may also have had additional regiments of Centurions and Shermans which were integral to some of the infantry divisions. An official US estimate was that of the fifteen full-strength infantry/mountain divisions of India, six were stationed in the central and eastern sectors along the Chinese-Indian border and on the East Pakistan-India border and three were in the Kashmir Valley. If this was accurate, then there remained just six infantry/mountain divisions and units of four under-strength divisions and all of India’s armour except for an unknown but possibly smaller number of light tanks available for use in the Punjab. This estimate roughly matches the Pakistan government’s, which claims that India deployed four infantry divisions (the 7th, 14th, 15th and 26th) the two mountain (the 4th and 6th) divisions, the 50th parachute regiment, the 41st Mountain Brigade, the 1st Armoured Division, the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade and two tank regiments (the 2nd Lancers and the 62nd Cavalry). According to a Pakistani source, these formations collectively added up to 77 infantry battalions, of which there are normally nine in an infantry division (G. Ahmed, 103) India claimed that this estimate was too high and Indian historians have generally omitted from the tally the two infantry/mountain divisions in reserve, the mountain and parachute brigade and the two tank regiments (Bhagat, 19–20). However, the estimate of neutral observers such as the Institute of Strategic Studies and the US was that India would be able to deploy more forces than it admitted. As far as Pakistan’s forces are concerned, the ISS estimated that on the eve of the war, Pakistan had six infantry divisions, one of which, 14 Infantry, was based in East Pakistan while another, 8 Infantry, had fought in the Rann of Kutch and was still in that area, which left four divisions along the Punjab/ Kashmir border. Pakistan was estimated to have around ten armoured regiments armed with M-47 and M-48 Pattons and M-4 Shermans, and two or three reconnaissance regiments armed with M-24 Chaffees. According to the ISS, the armoured regiments were probably formed into one armoured division and a separate independent armoured brigade while each infantry division was estimated to have one integral armoured unit. General Ahmed states that the Pakistan Army’s strength in 1965 was eight divisions, which included 1 Armoured Division and the newly-formed 6 Armoured Division. 11 Division had only been running for three months when war broke out in September and so was still under formation. The rough parity in armoured units conceals an advantage in numbers in favour of India, which was estimated to have 1,100 to 1,400 medium and light tanks while the Indians claim that Pakistan had between 800 and 900 tanks, including about 360 Patton tanks. It is impossible to say to what extent India’s numerical advantage was offset by the allegedly superior design of Pakistan’s main battle tank, the Patton, over India’s Centurion. The Patton outguns (90 against 84 mm) and outranges the Centurion (1,800 against 1,200 yards) and is also faster; it is also equipped with infra-red gunsight which enables it to fight at night. Furthermore, Pakistan’s artillery was superior to India’s but again India had the numerical advantage of around 2,500 pieces to Pakistan’s 900, though Pakistan’s heavy artillery had a greater range than India’s at 25,000 to 18,000 yards. As far as air strength was concerned, it is widely accepted that the PAF force’s strength in the west of the country when the war began was approximately eighty-five Sabres and twelve Starfighters. Assuming that 60 per cent of the Indian Air Force’s interceptors and fighter-bombers were allotted to the Western command, then India had at its disposal about sixty Mysteres, sixty Gnats, ninety Hunters as well as some Vampires, or an advantage of 210 to 97, which could easily be reinforced up to 300 by transferring planes from other parts of India. Because of India’s numerical superiority, the PAF had to refrain from combat wherever feasible as there are risks inherent in aerial combat and defeat there would have increased the overall vulnerability of Pakistani ground forces to air attack. Since 1947, the task of defending the city of Lahore had been given to 10 Division, under the overall command of 1 Corps of the Pakistan Army. A newly created 11 Division (of which more later) was by this time (in the summer of 1965) given the task of defending the southern approach to Lahore near Kasur. 10 Division comprised a mixture of infantry battalions and armoured regiments, which had one squadron of M-47 Patton tanks, the other tanks were Shermans. 11 Division was little more than three infantry battalions and was later bolstered by the arrival of Pakistan’s main armoured force, 1 Armoured Division, in its sector.

Riddle—a military retrospective

Apart from the obvious success of the main objective of relieving pressure on Akhnur and finally fighting a war on territory ‘of India’s choosing’, Riddle was a military failure. A large attacking force of three divisions was held with some ease by a much smaller and initially unprepared defensive force. Apart from the obvious advantage that most defensive forces have by virtue of being on familiar home ground, and the fact than an offensive force needs to be much larger, some serious deficiencies in the Indian military were exposed within forty-eight hours of the operation. These were: i)  Poor leadership from some senior commanders in the Indian army. Even aside from the obvious example of the unfortunate Prasad, other senior commanders seemed either hesitant or incompetent in their military operations and tactics. Despite having achieved the advantage of surprise and despite being faced with a smaller force, brigade and battalion commanders often lost touch with their senior officers and were unsure what to do when faced with determined defence or when things did not go exactly according to plan. There seemed also to be a prevailing culture of hesitation and ‘safety first’ amongst the Indian senior officers, and any serious resistance was often followed by requests by Indian brigade commanders and even generals to be allowed to withdraw rather than digging in to fight in order to hold on to hard-won territory within Pakistan.

 ii)  Poor co-ordination between the infantry, armour and artillery on the Indian side. On a number of occasions, the Indian infantry divisions advanced only to find themselves unsupported by artillery or armour. There seemed also to be a complete lack of co-ordination with the IAF which could have played a vital role in both reconnaissance and support in attacking Pakistani armour and artillery on the ground. Even when Indian tanks were used they were often led by the infantry, contrary to almost all principles of military tactics as tanks were usually used as battering rams to create the space for the following infantry. This led to the defensive forces having an easier time than they ought to have had. iii)  Inferior artillery. In the defensive battles fought between Pakistan and India, the superior range, quality and use of Pakistan’s artillery meant that the Indian big guns rarely had an opportunity to break up the enemy lines in the same way as Pakistan had managed in both the Chhamb and the Riddle offensives. Not only were the Indian guns inferior in range, their handling was also inept and they were usually if not always outgunned by the Pakistani counterparts. As the later British military review of the war pointed out, ‘Even Indian observers were impressed by the speed and accuracy of the retaliatory fire’ (British military review, p. 27). iv)  Riddle was too thinly spread. Although the wide front along three invasion points was originally seen as a strength, as it forced the smaller Pakistani forces to meet an attack from three different fronts, it actually resulted in the Indian attacks at each of the three points being more easily contained and the Indian attacks therefore being weaker at each point. When the defending Pakistani forces were able to halt the offensive, it left India vulnerable to Pakistani counter-attacks as there were insufficient reserves at each point to support the offensive troops and the overall effect of the large-scale offensive was lost. In simple terms, India pulled its punch and it was easier for Pakistan to fend it off.

 v)        Lack of strategic vision. Leaving aside the diplomatic fallout from India’s decision to cross the international boundary, in purely military terms objective of Riddle appears not to have been defined (at least from the documents and material available to date). If it was to capture and hold land east of the BRBD Canal, then why were so many determined efforts made to cross the bridges over that canal? If it was to capture Lahore, then why were more troops not committed to this objective, as the Indians must have been aware that the city would be defended hard? This ambiguity, however useful in diplomatic terms, could not have been helpful to soldiers fighting on the front without a clear direction from the senior commanders. In summary, although Riddle achieved its major objective of halting Pakistan’s capture of Akhnur, as a military operation it was far from encouraging for India. It exposed some of India’s military weaknesses and failed to damage Pakistan’s military capability except in the most general terms. In fact, India now faced the prospect of a Pakistani counter-attack on its own territory with some trepidation. There was, by 7 September, serious concern in India that the war that had now been taken to a new level could in fact backfire and result in Pakistan taking the military initiative. The initiative had surprisingly been handed back to Pakistan and now Pakistan had one (as it transpired, final) further chance to try and gain the military advantage.

CONTENTS

 1.  Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1 2.  Status Quo Ante Bellum 33 3.  Fighting in Kutch 65 4.  Operation Gibraltar 97 5.  Operation Grand Slam 129 6.  Operation Riddle 161 7.  Operation Mailed Fist 191 8.  Early Political and Diplomatic Moves 219 9.  Operation Nepal and Other Fronts 251 10.  Pressure for a Ceasefire 281 11.  Run-Up to Tashkent 313 12.  Tashkent 341 13.  Reflections on the War 367

Bibliography 397 Index 405

The book is printed in Pakistan by ILQA- An imprint of READINGS, Lahore