Was HRCP against Musharaf’s coup d’état?

Was HRCP against Musharaf’s coup d’état?

Had the HRCP  faith on the military government's commitment to the process of accountability by tricky NAB? The successive dictatorial regimes had used Local government system against political parties as well as provinces. Did NGOs check it in the Mushraff era?

Pakistan’s complex history has witnessed 4 dictators who used opposite ideas in order to extract some kind of support. Zia used the notion of Islam while Musharaf used liberalism (under the clever notion of enlightened moderation) and both got some kind of support from opposite groups yet in final analysis both dictators had interest in power only. 

Editorial said that "The sudden exile to Saudi Arabia in December of the government's best known political detainee, deposed prime minister Nawaz Sharif, who had been accused of multiple acts of corruption and other grave crimes, threw into doubt the military government's commitment to the process of accountability it had offered as the main justification for retaining powers.' It means that the HRCP had faith on the military government's commitment to the process of accountability?? Dictator had introduced dictatorial NAB laws same year yet in editorial it is missing too. The tricky law cannot check accountability of many power players as par the law. 

The report in editorial discussed first phase of tricky decentralization Plan (LB polls in 18 districts in December 2000) but strangely did not able to criticize absence of Local Bodies in cantonment areas. It is a reality that successive dictatorial regimes had used Local government system against political parties as well as provinces since Ayub times and at the time of 2001 non party local body elections the two major leaders were in exile. 

Here I am sharing editorial written just after a year of Musharaf’s coup d’état October 1999. It was an annual report of 2000 which is a regular publication of HRCP. All previous reports are not at HRCP website so it is hard to discuss it deeply. 2006 report is missing and all reports from 1990s till 2004 are also not at website. 

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Note: original scan copy is attached in the end

State of Human Rights in 2000

Introduction

While the HRCP's annual report for the year 2000 was being completed, Pakistan reached the end of the first year of its fourth period of military rule since Independence barely 53 years.

A sense of uncertainty continued to hang over the nation as it contemplated its own democratic future. The general elections promised by the military regime still seemed a long way off, and the ballotting process carried out so far, for the first phase mf elections to union councils in 18 districts of the country, did little to inspire confidence.

Mass confusion was caused by the complex voting procedure worked out for the polling exercise, while initial results were ominous. In the first place, there was little evidence that the devolution process would in any way attain the two main promises made by the government - that of truly handing over power to the grassroots level and producing a new political leadership. In the absence of a clear idea of the powers the councils at the union, tehsil and district level would wield and doubts over what resources would be made available to them to carry out projects, the question of giving powers into the hands of the people remained under shadow. The polls also, not unsurprisingly, speared to usher back traditional power groups, comprising influential feudals and politicians. At the same time, clans or 'biradaris' appeared once again to be resurgent, marking a distinct setback in the signs over the last decade of some decline in their spree of influence as political parties gained ground.

The issue of provincial autonomy, the mass boycott of polling by minorities and the question of whether local level democracy is possible in the absence of democratic institutions at the provincial and national levels all added to the sense of doubt.

The vacuum created by the military regime's strategy of discrediting and sidelining political parties and their leaders was ideally suited to the orthodox clergy, and its  formations took little time to move into the space left behind as political parties men pushed away. In a series of alarming actions, the clergy struck out fiercely against minority groups, especially the Ahmadi community, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). particularly those that tried to promote the rights of women. The outpourings of vicious hatred from these clergymen, in direct violation of law, not surprisingly resulted in numerous incidents of violence, harassment and even cold-blooded murder. The fact the authorities stood by as silent spectators indicated clearly that they were in fact colluding with the extremists against those peacefully, and lawfully, practising their beliefs or undertaking development work aimed at uplifting communities.

While pledges from the highest level of government of action to protect minority groups, restore joint electorate and act to halt the rising spate of the 'honour' killings of women continued to come in, ground realities remained largely unchanged - indeed marking a worsening of the situation over the previous year in some areas. More women were murdered across the country than in the preceding year as a result of motives stemming from perceived notions of 'honour', while crime of almost every kind remained on the rise.

The heightened violence and intolerance within society was also exhibited by the numerous cases of blasphemy registered against individuals. In repeated instances this appeared to stem from disputes of various kinds. A minor administrative adjustment proposed by the government in investigating cases of blasphemy, aimed at attempting to check precisely such misuse of the law, was taken back within weeks following pressure exerted by the orthodox clergy.

Political parties and their activists too faced a trying time. Following a law introduced early in the year barring public gatherings, the right to assembly remained fiercely suppressed throughout the year. Political activists were repeatedly taken into detention to deter them from peaceful assembly, and even indoor gatherings were at times interfered with, though the law permitted these. Aside from workers of political parties, trade unions, teachers and those raising attention against the injustices frequently meted out under the blasphemy law faced harsh action by police.

Conditions in which many detainees were held, including those held under the wide ranging powers allowed to the National Accountability Bureau, were frequently found to be inhumane and brutal. Reports of mistreatment in custody, torture and a denial of basic rights continued to come in. The sudden exile to Saudi Arabia in December of the government's best known political detainee, deposed prime minister Nawaz Sharif, who had been accused of multiple acts of corruption and other grave crimes, threw into doubt the military government's commitment to the process of accountability it had offered as the main justification for retaining powers.

For the judiciary too, the year started out on an ominous note. Members of the superior judiciary were required to take a new oath. Those who declined to do so were retired. Other members of the judiciary faced increased threat, with judges as well as lawyers falling victim to attacks on them.

The right of free movement for many remained restricted due to the use of the Exit Control List, which swelled to unprecedented proportions before being curtailed later in the year. Confusion and incomplete data about those on the list added further to the misery of many innocent travellers.

Despite some steps forward, including the release of prisoners accused of petty crimes and the introduction of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, the fate of those jailed across the country remained a miserable one. Riots breaking out in several prisons reflected the misery of prisoners, arising mostly from the repeated violations of the jail manual, overcrowding and the use of torture.

Against this backdrop, indicators showing progress in vital spheres such as education, health, the environment and housing remained bleak. Expenditure on these sectors crucial to the welfare of citizens remained amongst the lowest in the world, while other ventures in fact contributed to a worsening of the situation. The displacement of people from 'katchi abadis' where homes were demolished through the year continued to add greatly to their suffering, with the actions continuing despite protests by residents.

The situation of labourers, including the over 3.3 million child workers in the country, remained a dismal one. Many of them were held in bondage, both on agricultural hods mainly in Sindh and at brick kilns across the Punjab, in a direct violation of law. Others faced the most hazardous working conditions with little progress on efforts to improve their plight.

Yet, in difficult circumstances, efforts continued by organisations and individuals ID battle the odds. In some cases, there was evidence that the regime was responding to these brave bids. Pressure from the international community also aided them in certain cases in their task. These efforts kept alive hope that an improvement in the existing situation would, in time, come about and through a collective effort the quality of life of the tens of thousands facing injustice, discrimination and deprivation across the country change for the better.

Kami/a Hyat Editor